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Camarena: Attorney Discipline

COMMENT
DOMESTICALLY VIOLENT
ATTORNEYS: RESUSCITATING
AND TRANSFORMING A DUSTY,
OLD PUNITIVE APPROACH TO
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE INTO A
VIABLE PRESCRIPTION FOR
REHABILITATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Several cases imposing discipline on attorneys for acts of
domestic violence have arisen in the United States. 1 Overall,
courts agree that suspension is the appropriate degree of
sanction to impose in these cases. 2 Courts further agree that
1 See, e.g., Iowa State Bar Assoc. v. Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1985); In re
Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d 729 (1985); In re Runyon, 49 N.E. 2d 189 (Ind. 1986); In re Otto, 48
Cal. 3d 970 (1989); In re Hickey, 50 Cal. 3d 571 (1990); In re Walker, 597 N.E.2d
1271 (Ind. 1992); People v. Wallace, 837 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1992); People v. Senn, 824
P.2d 822 (Colo. 1992); People v. Knight, 883 P.2d 1055 (Colo. 1994); In re Magid, 655
A.2d 916 (N.J. 1995); In re Principato, 655 A.2d 920 (N.J. 1995); In re Howard, 673
A.2d 800 (N.J. 1996); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prorl Ethics and Conduct v. Polson, 569
N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1997); People v. Brailsford, 933 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1997); People v.
Shipman, 943 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1997); People v. Reaves, 943 P.2d 460 (Colo. 1997); In re
Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378 (N.J. 1997); People v. Musick, 960 P.2d 89 (Colo. 1998); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Painter, 739 A.2d 24 (Md. 1999); In re Van Buskirk, 981 P.2d 607 (Colo. 1999).
2 See Hickey, 50 Cal. 3d 571 (imposing a 30-day actual suspension); Howard, 673
A.2d 800 (imposing a 3-month actual suspension); Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378 (imposing a 3-month actual suspension); Wallace, 837 P.2d 1223 (imposing a 3-month actual
suspension); Walker, 597 N.E.2d 1271 (imposing a 6-month actual suspension); Shipman, 943 P.2d 458 (imposing a 6-month actual suspension); Knight, 883 P.2d 1055
(imposing a 6-month actual suspension); Reaves, 943 P.2d 460 (imposing a 6-month
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imposing discipline on attorneys for non-professional misconduct is appropriate to protect the public, preserve the reputation and integrity of the legal profession, and enhance public
confidence in attorneys.3 However, uniformity in the disciplinary process is lacking.4 As a result, attorneys who commit
acts of domestic violence have no way of anticipating the level
of professional discipline that they may receive. More importantly, the public cannot anticipate the level of discipline that
domestically violent attorneys will receive; this is important
since a primary goal of attorney discipline in these cases is to
enhance public confidence in the profession. These are the
major shortcomings of the current approach to disciplining attorneys who engage in acts of domestic violence.
Part II of this Comment will discuss (1) the prevalence of
domestic violence in America, (2) the governmental responses
to domestic violence, and (3) preserving the integrity of the legal profession. This Comment will then focus on how disciplinary courts have treated domestically violent attorneys. Part
III examines the murky judicial approach to disciplining domestically violent attorneys, and Part IV criticizes that approach. Finally, Part V sets forth a proposal to cure the ill effects of the current approach, by injecting a greater degree of
uniformity, ease, predictability and certainty into the disciplinary process.
II.

BACKGROUND

Before focusing specifically on domestically violent attorneys, a general discussion of the prevalence of domestic violence in the United States is necessary to recognize the potential for such disciplinary cases arising in the future. 5
Additionally, an examination of some of the federal and Caliactual suspension); Otto, 48 Cal. 3d 970 (imposing a 6-month actual suspension);
Brailsford, 933 P.2d 592 (imposing a l-year-and-l-day actual suspension); Musick,
960 P.2d 89 (imposing a l-year-and-l-day actual suspension); Polson, 569 N.W.2d 612
(imposing a 2-year actual suspension); Van Buskirk, 981 P.2d 607 (imposing a 3-year
actual suspension); Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798 (imposing an indefinite suspension
with eligibility for reinstatement after 3 months).
3 See, e.g., Nevill, 39 Cal 3d at 736.
4 See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1.
5 See discussion infra Parts II.A.l, II.B.l.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss2/3

2

Camarena: Attorney Discipline

2001]

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

157

fornia governmental responses to domestic violence will highlight the important seat this issue has taken in American society.6 Further, a brief introduction to the doctrines
underlying the rationale for disciplining attorney misconduct
is necessary for a better understanding of the process. 7 Finally, a discussion of how disciplinary courts have dealt with
domestically violent attorneys will underscore the problems
underlying the current approach to the problem, specifically
inconsistency and unpredictability.s

A.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:

A NATIONAL GLIMPSE

1. The Prevalence of Domestic Violence in America

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Report estimated that in 1995 close to 58,000 of 214,464 victims
of violence were related to the offender. 9 In 1998, although the
ratio remained the same,lO the actual number of incidents almost doubled. l l Victims of reported violence increased to
421,493, while the number of those victims that were related
to the offenders increased to 112,042.12 Moreover, a Bureau of
Justice Statistics (hereinafter "BJS") special report estimated
that in 1998 about one million violent crimes occurred among
persons intimately involved 13 with one another.14 These
figures indicate that domestic violence is a metastasizing national problem.
See discussion infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2.
See infra notes 68-97 and accompanying text.
S See discussion infra Part II.D.1-3.
9 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, THE STRUCTURE
OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED INCIDENTS, at 4 (1995).
10 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, INCIDENTS OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF 1998 NIBRS DATA, at 280 (1998).
11 See id.
12 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 9.
13 See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON AND SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, at 8 (2000) (defining intimate partner relationships as those
involving former or current spouses, former or current boy/girlfriends that may be of
the same gender).
14 See id. at 1 (noting a 21% decrease from the 1993 statistics on intimate partner violence committed against women, whereas intimate violence committed against
men stayed about the same).
6
7
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Even more alarming is the fact that between 1993 and
1998, the BJS estimates that only about half of all domestic
violence victims reported the incidents to the authorities. 15
The reason most often given by victims for not reporting the
violence was that they considered the incident to be a "private
or personal matter."16 The second-most cited reason for not reporting these incidents was fear of reprisal by the offenderP
Other reasons given by victims who did not report the incidents included the following: (1) the minor nature of the
crime; (2) presumed police apathy; (3) the victim's desire to
protect the offender; (4) fear of police bias; (5) inconvenience
of filing a report; (6) the victims had already reported the incident to another official; (7) the perception that the police
would be ineffective at preventing the offender from abusing
again; and (8) the victim's uncertainty as to whether a crime
had actually occurred. 1S Based on the BJS statistics and its
survey of victims, adding the unreported incidents to the reported incidents could double the number of acts of domestic
violence that occur in the United States. 19

2. The National Effort to Stem the Occurrence of Domestic
Violence
In 1984, Congress enacted the Family Violence Prevention
and Services Act (hereinafter "FVPSA").20 The FVPSA states
two goals. Its first goal is to assist states in increasing public
awareness of domestic violence. 21 Its second goal is to provide
funding for family violence education and training to states,
local public agencies,22 and nonprofit private organizations. 23
Under the FVPSA, the federal government provides grants to
See id. at 7, Table 7.
See id. at 7, Table 8 (reporting 35% of female victims and 52% of male
victims).
17 See id. (reporting 19% of female victims and not reporting for male victims).
18 See RENNISON & WELCHANS, supra note 13.
19 See id.
20 42 US.C §§ 10401-10418 (2000).
21 See id. § 10401 (stating goals of providing shelter and related services to domestic violence victims).
22 See id. § 10401(2) (defining public agencies as including law enforcement,
courts, legal and social services and health care professionals).
23 See id.
15

16
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states to further these goals. 24
Continuing its efforts to combat domestic violence, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (hereinafter "VAWA").25 Under the VAWA, the United States Attorney General provides grants to eligible states for use in the
prevention of domestic violence by earmarking funds for state
level programs. In total, VAWA provides $3.3 billion in state
grants to be used for such purposes as providing social and legal services for domestic violence victims, as well as establishing battered women shelters.26
Additional grants are available to states that demonstrate
increases in the percentage of either arrests or time served
for violent crimes. 27 The Attorney General may also grant
24 See id. § 10402; see also 42 U.S.C. § 10403(a)(1) (granting to each qualifying
state up to $400,000 per year); id. § 10404 (requiring the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee the FVPSA); id. § 10405 (requiring
the Secretary to report to congress biannually to assess the FVPSA's efficacy).
25 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-13712 (2000). The purpose of the VAWA is reflected in
its subtitle: "Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-In-Sentencing Incentive
Grants." See id. § 13708 (a) (1) (A-E) (2000) (providing appropriations of over $997
million in authorized appropriations to eligible states for the 1996 fiscal year and
providing for these amounts to increase yearly until 2000. For the 1997 fiscal year,
over $1.3 billion were made available to states. In 1998, that amount increased to
over $2.5 billion. In the 1999 fiscal year over $2.6 billion were available. In 2000, the
fmal fiscal year provided for in the VAWA, over $2.75 billion were made available to
states to subsidize the incarceration of violent offenders to facilitate a greater amount
of prison time actually served.).
26 These grants will continue under VAWA 2000, which was passed by Congress
on October 12, 2000. VAWA 2000 provides $3.3 billion in state grants, through 2005
for the following purposes "$200 million to provide civil and legal services to victims
of domestic and sexual violence; $875 million for shelter services for battered women;
$140 million to address violence against women on college campuses; programs to
fund transitional housing for women fleeing domestic violence; grant programs to
help service providers address the needs of women with disabilities who are victims
of domestic and sexual violence; and significant protections for battered immigrant
women, who can face immigration law consequences if they seek to flee from or support prosecution of their abuser." See VAWA Passes!, The Family Violence Prevention
Fund Website, (visited October 12, 2000) <http://www.fvpf.orglnewsflash>. To qualify
for these grants, a state must apply to the U.S. Attorney General. See 42 U.S.C. §
13703(b) (2000). In doing so, the state must declare that its correctional policies and
programs ensure the following: (1) violent offenders serve a su1;>stantial portion of
their sentences, (2) severe punishment for violent offenders, and (3) the prison time
served reflects the determination that the offender is violent. See 42 U.S.C. §
13703(a).
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 13703(b)(1-2).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3

160 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2

funds to states that demonstrate an increase in the combined
percentage of persons arrested and prison timed served for violent crimes. 28 States become eligible for additional VAWA
grants by demonstrating increases of 10% or more in the
number of offenders convicted of violent crimes and sentenced
to prison within the most recent 3-year period. 29 Accordingly,
funding for state programs, such as the one proposed by this
Comment,30 that strike at domestic violence is available. 31
States may also qualify for truth-in-sentencing grants
under the VAWA.32 These grants are available to states that
have implemented sentencing laws that require violent offenders to serve at least 85% of the sentence imposed. 33 Grants
are also available to states that plan to implement sentencing
laws requiring persons convicted of violent crimes to actually
serve at least 85% of the sentence imposed. 34 Finally, states
that prescribe indeterminate sentences may qualify for truthin-sentencing grants by showing that violent offenders serve,
on average, at least 85% of either "the prison term established under the State's sentencing and release guidelines 35
[ . .. ] or [ ... ] the maximum prison term allowed" under
the court imposed sentence. 36 Giving needed support to the
national fight against domestic violence, states, such as California, have also committed resources to that cause.
B. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALIFORNIA GLIMPSE

1. The Prevalence of Domestic Violence in California
California's Criminal Justice Statistics Center (hereinafter "CJSC") reported 56,892 arrests for domestic violence in
See id. § 13703(c)(1).
See id. § 13703(c)(2).
30 See infra Part V.
31 Although truth-in-sentencing legislation does note directly combat domestic violence, when states adopt such sentencing guidelines, and thus qualify for federal
funds under VAWA, that money is earmarked for use in preventing and treating domestic violence. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, supra note 26.
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 13704.
33 See id. § 13704(a)(1)(B) (suggesting that states may qualify intentionally or by
happenstance).
34 See id. § 13704(a)(2).
35 See id. § 13704(a)(3)(A).
38 See id. § 13704(a)(3)(B).
28

29
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1998. 37 That number grew from 31,886 arrests in 1988. 38 In
1988, approximately 114 out of every 100,000 persons of California's total population were arrested for domestic violence. 39
In 1998, that ratio grew to nearly 170 arrests per 100,000
persons. 40 Accordingly, domestic violence arrests in California
are on the rise at a rate of over 3% per year.41 The CJSC suggests that "public awareness influenced by high profile
cases,42 women's resource centers and shelters, and new legislation" may be factors behind this rise in arrests. 43

2. California's Fight against Domestic Violence
California has taken an active role to eliminate domestic
violence. 44 In 1986, California's legislature enacted Senate Bill
(hereinafter "SB") 1472, requiring police officers to: (1) treat
domestic violence as a criminal act; (2) create new guidelines
for handling domestic violence cases; (3) attend domestic violence training programs; and (4) track domestic violence incidents. 45 This legislation seeks to improve police response to
domestic violence.
In 1988, the state assembly followed the senate's lead by
enacting Assembly Bill (hereinafter "AB") 1599. 46 AB 1599 requires the presiding judge of the Superior Court in each
county to designate at least one judicial official to issue temporary restraining orders to protect victims, and their chil37 See BUREAU OF CRIM. INFO. AND ANALYSIS, CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON ARRESTS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1998, 1 CRIM. JUST. STAT. CENTER REPORT
SERIES 3, at 7, Table 1 (1999).

id.
id.
40
id.
41
id. Note that 1994, the year of the O.J. Simpson murder trial, hosted the
largest increase (10.3%) in the rate of arrests for domestic violence from the previous
year, whereas 1998 hosted the largest decrease (12%) in the rate of domestic violence
38

39

See
See
See
See

arrests from the previous year.
42 See The Your Family's Health Website (visited February 15, 2001) <http://
www.yourfamilyshealth.com!community_healthldome stic/> (pointing out that the O.J.
Simpson and Warren Moon cases have raised public awareness of domestic violence
to a new level.).
43 See BUREAU OF CRIM. INFO. AND ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 5 .

.. See id.
45 See id. at 5-6.
46 See id. at 6.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3

162 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2
dren, from domestic violence during periods when court is not
in sessionY A potential victim of domestic violence may seek
this protective order by informing the police of a recent incident or threat of domestic violence that has occurred. 48 The
judicial official may then issue the order after a police officer
"asserts reasonable grounds to believe that a person is in immediate and present danger of domestic violence."49
Further, in 1987, the state legislature amended California
Penal Code Section 12028.5 50 to authorize police officers to
seize firearms found at domestic violence scenes. 51 When the
police have reasonable cause to believe that returning the
weapon will endanger someone within the household, they
may petition the court, within 30 days of the confiscation, 52 to
determine whether the firearm should be returned. 53 Thus,
the legislature has empowered local law enforcement agencies
with the means to prevent more serious, perhaps even fatal,
injuries to domestic violence victims.
Enacted in 1995,54 SB 132, amended California Penal
Code Section 13519. 55 This amendment requires patrol officers
to attend domestic violence training sessions biannually. 56
47 See A.B. 1599, 1987-1988 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1988), codified at CAL. Crv. CODE §
4359 (2000). CAL. Crv. CODE § 4359 was repealed by Stats.1993, c. 219 (A.B.1500), §
39.5. But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 6300, et.seq., continuing former CAL. Crv. CODE § 4359
without substantive change.
48 See sources cited supra note 47.
49 See sources cited supra note 47.
50 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 12028.5(b), amended by S.B. 2025, Regular Sess. 19992000 (Cal. 2000). (allowing the seizure of a firearm when the firearm is in plain sight
of the police officer or after a consensual search necessary to protect the officer or
others).
51 See BUREAU OF CRIM. INFO. AND ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 6.
52 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12028.5, amended by S.B. 2025, Regular Sess. 19992000 (Cal. 2000). (enabling the police to request an extension to 60 days).
53 See id.
54 See The California Senate Website (visited September 4, 2000) <http://
info.sen.ca.gov/pub/95-96/billlsen/sb_0101-0150/sb_132_bill_history.html>.
55 See BUREAU OF CRIM. INFO. AND ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 6.
56 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 13519(e) (2000). The instruction stresses the following:
the importance of enforcing domestic violence laws; the accessibility of civil remedies,
such as temporary restraining orders, and community resources, such as battered women shelters; and victim protection. [d. Police officers, the California State Bar Association, the California Women Lawyers' Association, domestic violence experts and at
least one former victim of domestic violence, among others, developed these lessons.
[d. at § 13519(d). This law seeks to improve police empathy for responding to,
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That same year, the California legislature amended California
Penal Code § 13701 to require law enforcement agencies to
create written domestic violence response policies encouraging
arrest of offenders. 57 Therefore, police officers' sensitivity to
domestic violence is heightened.
California has also received grants under VAWA to further its efforts to prevent and respond to domestic violence. 58
In addition to the 1999 VAWA funds, California allocated approximately $6.8 million for domestic violence programs to its
Office of Criminal Justice Planning. 59 For example, in 1999
the state legislature allocated over $5.5 million for rape pre.
vention efforts. 60

C.

PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

In addition to federal and state legislative efforts to stem
domestic violence, the state bar associations and courts (hereinafter "disciplinary officials") have adopted active roles as
well. When a perpetrator of domestic violence is an attorney,
these disciplinary officials treat this as misconduct that negatively impacts on an attorney's fitness to practice law. 61 California has developed an attorney disciplinary system to address attorney misconduct.
California's State Bar Court (hereinafter "State Bar
preventing, and remedying domestic disputes on a continuing basis. See BUREAU OF
CRIM. INFo. AND ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 6.
67
See BUREAU OF CRIM. INFo. AND ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 6. Under this law,
police must attempt to ascertain the most significant aggressor of the domestic dispute. The officer must consider the following factors in deciding who that aggressor
is: (1) protecting the victim from continuing abuse; (2) threats of physical injury; (3)
the history of domestic disputes between the parties involved; and (4) whether either
person involved acted in self-defense. Although police may arrest both parties involved, they are discouraged from doing so by having to decide who is the most significant aggressor. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 13701(b) (2000).
58 See Fiscal Summary: Hearing on S.B. 1B7 Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 1994-1995 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1995) (showing $3 million received from the
VAWA); Vwlence Against Women: Appropriation of Federal Funds: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Criminal Procedure, 1996-1997 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1997) (showing
approximately $11.5 million received); S.B. 160, 1999-2000 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1999)
(demonstrating receipt of almost $13 million under the VAWA).
59 See S.B. 160, 1999-2000 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1999).
60 See id.
61 See Levin, supra note 4, at 5-6.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3

164 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2
Court") hears and decides attorney discipline cases. 62 The
State Bar Court may independently censure attorneys.63 For
more severe attorney sanctions, such as suspension and disbarment, the State Bar Court makes findings of facts, conclusions of law, and recommends the extent of discipline to the
California Supreme Court.64 The Supreme Court then reviews
the State Bar Court's findings and conclusions,65 then determines whether the recommended sanction is appropriate. 66 If
not, the Supreme Court may impose the sanction it deems appropriate. 67 The remainder of this section will discuss the reasoning for imposing professional discipline on domestically violent attorneys.
Fitness to practice law involves more than being an effective lawyer;68 it also requires that a lawyer refrain from conduct that evinces disrespect for the law, the courts, and the
legal profession. 69 Although domestic violence is not directly
related to the practice of law, courts nevertheless view acts of
domestic violence as misconduct deserving of professional discipline for three primary reasons: preserving the integrity of
the legal profession, protecting the public, and maintaining
public confidence in the law. 70 A general discussion of the
model guidelines for disciplining attorney misconduct discloses the rationale behind imposing sanctions on attorneys
for committing acts of domestic violence.
62 See The California State Bar Court Website (visited November 19, 2000) <http:/
/www.calbar.org/DisciplineIBKG.htm> .

63

See id.

64

See id.

65

See id.

66

See, e.g., Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 730.

67 See id. at 737-739 (rejecting the State Bar Court's recommendation to suspend
Nevill for five years and instead opting for disbarment).
68

See, e.g., Painter, 739 A.2d 24.

69

See id.

See Karen A. Geraghty, Note, Bruising the Legal Profession: Attorney Discipline for Acts of Domestic Violence, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 451 (1997). Thus, disciplinary officials have given no credence to the fact that domestic violence is a problem that
generally lurks behind closed doors. See Mark Hansen, Big Brother Bar: Jury is Out
on Disciplining Lawyer's Private Conduct, ABA JOURNAL, November 2000, at 14; See
also, e.g., Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 736.
70
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1. American Bar Association Guidelines

The American Bar Association (hereinafter "ABA") states
that a lawyer's responsibilities include conforming his or her
conduct to the law both professionally and personally.71 To ensure this end, the ABA established the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter "Model Rules")72 and the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter "Model
Code").73 Although a majority of states continue to adopt versions of the Model Rules, thereby phasing out reliance on the
Model Code, courts imposing lawyer discipline generally adhere to the standards of professional conduct in the Model
Code, which closely parallel the Model Rules. 74
The stated goals of both the Model Rules and Model Code
are to protect the public from morally deficient lawyers,75 bolster public confidence in the legal profession,76 and maintain
the integrity and competence of the bar.77 The Model Code
further recommends that lawyers be "temperate and dignified,
and [ . . . ] refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible
conduct."7s Accordingly, the Model Code sets forth the minimum standards of attorney conduct. 79 Under the Model Code
an attorney shall not: (1) violate a disciplinary rule,so (2) circumvent a disciplinary rule through another's actions,S! (3)
engage in conduct involving moral turpitude,s2 (4) engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta71 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (hereinafter "MODEL RULES"), Preamble, Paragraph 4 (1999).
72 See id. Paragraph 6.
73 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (hereinafter "MODEL CODE")
Canon 1 (1983).
74 See STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 459 (2000).
75 See MODEL CODE EC 1-2, EC 1-3; MODEL RULES Preamble, Paragraph 4.
76 See MODEL CODE EC 1-5; see also MODEL RULES, Preamble, Paragraph 11 (discUBsing the profession's responsibility to conceive its self-regulation in the public
interest).
77 See MODEL CODE EC 1-1; see also MODEL RULES, Preamble, Paragraph 6.
78 See MODEL CODE EC 1-5.
79 See id. DR 1-102.
80 See id. DR 1-102(A)(1).
81 See id. DR 1-102(A)(2).
82 See id. DR 1-102(A)(3).
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tion,83 (5) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,84 or (6) engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. 85 An attorney
who violates any of these standards may be subject to professional discipline. 86 In determining whether disciplinary action
is required, the Model Rules suggest that the disciplinary officials assess the surrounding mitigating87 and aggravating88
circumstances. 89 Particularly important to this assessment are
the willfulness of the misconduct, seriousness of the violation
as well as the existence of any previous violations. 90

2. The Case for Imposing Sanctions on Domestically Violent
Attorneys
Most states have adopted versions of the Model Code and
Model Rules. 91 Thus, the rationales given in attorney discipline cases involving domestically violent attorneys generally
mirror three of the six ABA standards listed above: (1) protection of the public, (2) enhancement of the administration of
justice, and (3) preservation of public confidence in the legal
profession. 92 Yet, without explanation, few courts define acts
of domestic violence as involving moral turpitude. 93 Conduct
involving moral turpitude is behavior that is contrary to modern day justice or morality.94 The moral turpitude factor is important to this Comment's proposal for imposing professional
See MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(4).
See id. DR 1-102(A)(5).
85 See id. DR 1-102~A)(6).
88 See Levin, supra note 4.
87 See id. at 33 (identifying mitigating factors as including absence of prior professional discipline, personal or emotional problems, mental disability, and chemical
dependency).
88 See id. (identifying aggravating factors as including the existence of prior discipline, a pattern of misconduct, and vulnerability of the victim).
89 See MODEL CODE Scope, at Paragraph 5.
90 See id.
91 See Geraghty, supra note 70, at 469-470.
92 See Levin, supra note 4, at 5-6.
93 See Brailsford, 933 P.2d 592 (imposing a suspension of 1 year and 1 day); Runyon, 49 N.E. 2d 189 (imposing disbarment); Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798 (ordering indefinite suspension).
94 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1026 (7th ed. 1999) (hereinafter a reference to
"censure" includes "reprimand" since they are interchangeable).
83

84

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss2/3

12

Camarena: Attorney Discipline

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

2001]

167

discipline on domestically violent attorneys.95
Courts uniformly hold that domestically violent attorneys
deserve professional discipline even though the conduct may
not be directly related to the practice of law. 96 Accordingly,
courts need only determine the appropriate professional sanction once an attorney is found to have committed an act of domestic violence. 97
D. SANCTIONS CURRENTLY IMPOSED AGAINST DOMESTICALLY VIOLENT ATTORNEYS

Courts throughout the nation impose discipline on attorneys for committing acts of domestic violence. 98 These courts
generally impose one of three levels of discipline: public censure or reprimand,99 suspension,lOO or disbarment. lOl The extent of discipline imposed on a domestically violent attorney is
determined by an ad hoc, case-by-case analysis. lo2 As a result,
no uniform sanction applies to acts of domestic violence.

1. Censure or Reprimand
A censure or reprimand is an official condemnation of an
attorney for engaging in minor conduct that is subject to discipline. lo3 The censure is either public or private. In public
censure, the state bar publicizes the censured attorney's
name. 104 But if the sanction is private censure, then the attorney's name remains confidential. lo5 Public censure is the least
severe discipline imposed upon domestically violent
attorneys.106
96
96
97

See
See
See
See
See

discussion infra Part V.A.
Geraghty, supra note 70.

id.

cases cited supra note 1.
Senn, 824 P.2d 822 (ordering public censure); Principato, 655 A.2d 920 (ordering public reprimand); Magid, 655 A.2d 916 (ordering public reprimand).
100 See cases cited supra note 2.
101 See Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d 729; Runyon, 49 N.E. 2d 189; Painter, 739 A.2d 24.
102 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROCEDURE OF STATE BAR, Title IV, Introduction
98

99

(1986).
103

104
106

106

See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 94, at 216.
See, e.g., 1 WITKIN CAL. PRoc. ATTYS § 668 (a) (2nd ed. 2000 Supp.).
See id.
See cases cited supra note 99; see also AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION Standards
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The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Senn ordered
public censure of a domestically violent attorney.107 In Senn,
attorney Kenneth Senn came home drunk to an angry wife. lOS
An argument ensued, which quickly escalated into a physical
fight. After striking each other, Mrs. Senn ordered her husband to leave. 109 Senn refused, pulled out his wife's gun and
pointed it at her. "I should kill you," he muttered. llo "Why
don't you then?" she replied.l ll Senn began up the stairs to
sleep, gun still in hand. His wife followed behind him insisting that he leave. 1l2 Senn fired the gun several feet above her
head to end the argument. 113 Mrs. Senn phoned her parents. 1l4
Attorney Senn got on the line, spoke with them briefly, then
left the house. 115 The next day, the police arrested Senn for
felony menacing and third degree assault. llS Although the
prosecutor eventually dropped the charges, the Colorado Supreme Court ordered that attorney Senn be publicly
censured. 117
The Court found that Senn's actions deserved public censure because they displayed a "very critical failure of judgment"llS and "evinced a contempt for the law which was at
odds with [his] duty to uphold the law."1l9 The court reasoned
that the goals of professional discipline are to bolster an attorney's respect for the law, and to protect the public against
attorneys with bad judgment. 120 Further, the court rejected
Senn's argument that professional discipline was inappropriate for conduct that is neither directly related to the lawyer's
2.6, Commentary (recognizing that private censures are reserved for negligent attorney conduct only).
107 824 P.2d 822.
108 See id. at 823.
109 See id.
110 See id.
III See id.
112 See Senn, 824 P.2d at 823.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See Senn, 824 P.2d at 823 (noting that acquittal of criminal charges does not
necessarily bar disciplinary action).
118 See id. at 824-825.
119 See id.
120 See id.
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honesty and integrity nor indicates a conscious indifference to
the law. l2l Although Senn argued that he no longer abused alcohol, and had reconciled with his wife, the court held that
Senn's intentional conduct posed a "significant danger of serious injury," and thus warranted public censure.122

2. Suspension
Suspension from the practice of law is the courts' most
commonly ordered sanction for domestically violent attorneys.123 Suspension is a disciplinary action that prohibits an
attorney from practicing law, or even holding himself or herself out as being able to practice law, within the jurisdiction
of the ordering court.124 The two types of suspension imposed
are stayed suspension and actual suspension. 125 Court ordered
suspensions have ranged from a 3-year stayed suspension
with a 30-day actual suspension 126 to an actual indefinite suspension with eligibility for reinstatement within 3 months. 127
In In ·re Hickey,128 the California Supreme Court suspended a domestically violent attorney.129 In that case, while
at a nightclub, an attorney struck his wife on the side of the
head with a gun and fled before police arrived. 130 Hickey's
wife ran to a neighbor's house. 131 Hickey followed her,
threatened to hurt her, and then went home. 132 Early the next
morning, after Mrs. Hickey returned home she called "911,"
but when the police arrived she insisted that they leave. 133
See id.
See Senn, 824 P.2d at 824-825.
123 See cases cited supra note 2.
12-( See The State Bar of California Website, The Glossary of Terms Relating to Attorney Discipline (visited January 20, 2001) <http://www.calbar.orglDiscipline/
Glossary.htm>.
125 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROCEDURE OF STATE BAR, supra note 102, Standard 1.4 (recognizing stayed suspension, actual suspension and stayed suspension
which includes an actual suspension as a condition).
126 See, e.g., Hickey, 50 Cal. 3d 57!.
127 See, e.g., Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798.
128 50 Cal. 3d 57!.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 574-575.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See Hickey, 50 Cal. 3d at 574-575.
121

122
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Mrs. Hickey summoned the police again. 134 Upon arrival, the
police officers noticed Hickey walk out of his house with a
handgun hidden in his waistband. 135 Hickey was subsequently
convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. 136
The California Supreme Court suspended Hickey from the
practice of law for three years. 137 The court stayed all but 30
days of Hickey's suspension, but conditioned the stay upon
completion of three years probation. 13s Additionally, Hickey
had to retake, and pass, California's professional responsibility examination within one year of the date of discipline. 139 In
determining the appropriateness of this sanction, the court
considered another incident of domestic violence that had occurred a month earlier between Hickey and his wife. 140 The
Hickey court recognized that the primary purpose behind imposing professional sanctions on domestically violent attorneys is to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession.141 Furthermore, by imposing discipline in these cases,
the court .also maximizes professional standards and preserves the public trust in attorneys. 142

3. Disbarment
Disbarment is the most severe professional sanction that
a disciplinary court may impose on an attorney.143 Once a
See id.
See id.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 575-576.
138 See Hickey, 50 Cal. 3d at 575-576.
139 See id.
140 In that incident, Hickey slapped his wife's face for dancing with another man
at a lounge. She tried to leave, but Hickey chased her. When he caught up with his
wife, Hickey swung at her but missed. He pushed her instead. A by-stander yelled for
Hickey to stop the beating, but he did not relent. Instead, Hickey ripped a metal sign
from the ground and swung it at the by-stander's head. While being arrested, Hickey
threatened to get his gun and shoot all of the by-standers. Ms. Hickey, shoeless and
with blood dripping from her nose, told the police that this happened all the time and
that her fear of Hickey made her hesitant to press charges against him. The charges
of assault with a deadly weapon and spousal abuse were suspended on the condition
that Hickey attend an Anger Awareness Program. See id. at 572.
141 See, e.g., id. at 578.
142 See id.
143 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROCEDURE OF STATE BAR, supra note 102, Standard 1.2(c).
134

135
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court orders disbarment, an attorney is indefinitely expelled
from the practice of law. 144 However, a disbarred attorney may
petition the court for reinstatement after a court-specified period of time. 145 Three courts nationwide have disbarred an attorney for acts of domestic violence. 146
A California Supreme Court decision, In re Nevill,147 is
the lead case. In Nevill, an attorney invited his wife to
lunch. 148 When she refused, he became suspicious. 149 Nevill
went to a friend's house. While there, Nevill snorted cocaine,
smoked marijuana, and planned on finding someone to assault his wife's lover.150 Nevill invited his wife to lunch again,
but she declined. 151 So he drove to her workplace, hid in the
bushes, and watched her leave with another man. 152 Nevill
tried to follow them but could not keep Up.153 He had drinks,
snorted more cocaine, picked his daughter up from nursery
school, and drove to his wife's office, where he confronted
her.154 Nevill said he was leaving her and taking their child. 155
When he arrived home he hid a rifle on the bed under a
sheet, began to pack, and snorted more cocaine. 156 When his
wife arrived, he accused her of going to a hotel with her
lover.157 She said that she had not slept with the man "this
week."158 Nevill ordered her to call her lover, but she could not
reach him.159 Nevill pulled the rifle from under the sheet and
shot three rounds into the bedroom floor.160 Mrs. Nevill yelled,
"You really are crazy aren't yoU?"161 Neville turned, fired ap144
145
146

147
148

149
150
151
152

153

154
155

156
157
158
159

160
161

See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 94, at 475.
See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROCEDURE OF STATE BAR, supra note 102.
See cases cited supra note 101.
39 Cal. 3d 729.
id. at 732-733.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.

id.
id.

Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 732-733.
id.
id.
id.
id.

Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 732-733.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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proximately ten rounds and killed her. 162
The Nevill court reiterated that the primary purpose of
imposing discipline against attorneys is to protect the public,
the courts, and the legal profession. 163 The Supreme Court
reasoned that these protections were necessary as Nevill's actions had "displayed a dangerous volatility which might well
prejudice his ability to effectively represent his clients' interests given the pressures associated with the practice of law."164
Though Nevill offered several mitigating circumstances,165 the
court disbarred him.166 In doing so, the court explained that
disbarment would best protect the public because it facilitated
a future evaluation of Nevill's future fitness to practice law
through reappraisal, should Nevill ever seek reinstatement.l 67
That the lack of uniformity in lawyer discipline leads to
the imposition of inconsistent sanctions in domestic violence
cases is self-evident. 168 Despite attempts to follow the ABA
standards, disciplinary courts impose disparate degrees of discipline 169 that often do not reflect the severity of the acts committed. Part III of this Comment explores the shortcomings of
the current approach to imposing discipline on domestically
violent attorneys.
III.

DISCUSSION

As the cases outlined above demonstrate, disciplinary
courts across the United States employ case-by-case analysis
in determining the extent of discipline to be imposed against
See Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 732-733.
See id. at 735
164 See id.
166 The mitigating factors included marital disharmony, Nevill being under the
influence of cocaine and alcohol the day of the incident, a vehement argument precipitated the killing, Nevill was serving an 8 year prison sentence, he had no prior discipline, he was cooperative with disciplinary officials, and the killing was unrelated to
the practice of law. See id. at 735-736.
166 See id. at 737-738 (going beyond the recommended 5-year suspension, with 30
months actual suspension, 5 years probation, quarterly reports to the bar, mandatory
psychiatric treatment and abstinence from drugs).
167 See Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 738-739 (recognizing that all disbarred attorneys, after five years, may seek reinstatement).
168 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 4, at 37.
169 See id.
162
163
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an attorney for acts of domestic violence. 17o This approach results in inconsistent and unpredictable sanctions.171 These results are the source of the problem to the current approach to
attorney discipline. 172

A.

ATTACK ON THE CURRENT ,ApPROACH TO DETERMINING THE
SANCTION TO BE IMPOSED ON DOMESTICALLY VIOLENT ATTORNEYS

The current approach solely applies case-by-case analysis,
which leads to ambiguous standards and unpredictable outcomes.173 Courts generally agree that an attorney's domestically violent acts are a legitimate basis for sanctions, yet no
standards have been established for determining the extent of
sanction to be imposedY4 From public reprimand 175 to disbarment,176 the range of sanctions is broad and often inconsistent.177 In fact, the New Jersey Supreme Court is the only disciplinary authority that has imposed standard sanctions
against domestically violent attorneys. It has, de facto, decided that a 3-month actual suspension is the appropriate
sanction in the majority of these cases. 178 However, because
the court is not bound to that sanction,179 disciplinary results
are still unpredictable in New Jersey.
Whenever courts apply case-by-case analysis the judicial
process becomes less efficient because this approach is fact intensive. 180 Under a fact-driven approach, the court ideally
must compare the case at bar with every case in which courts
have disciplined domestically violent attorneys to determine
whether the appropriate discipline to impose is censure, susSee generally, Levin, supra note 4.
See id.
172 See id.
173 See Levin, supra note 4, at 35-38.
174 See id. at 38-39.
175 See, e.g., Senn, 824 P.2d 822.
176 See, e.g., Painter, 739 A.2d 24.
177 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 4.
178 See Howard, 673 A.2d 800; Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378; In re Toronto, 696 A.2d
8 (N.J. 1998). The courts imposed a 3-month suspension in each of these cases.
179 See, e.g., Principato, 655 A.2d at 919 (avowing to suspension as the appropriate sanction for domestically violent attorneys but remaining silent as to the duration
of such suspension); See also, Levin, supra note 4.
180 See, e.g., Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1, 44 (1987).
.
170

171
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pension, or disbarment. 181 Suspension is the most troublesome
sanction because it further requires the court to square the
law with the facts of the case at hand to justify the length of
the suspension. 182 Thus, case-by-case analysis injects an additional step into the disciplinary process that is unnecessarily
time-consuming and wasteful of judicial resources.
B. PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING PROFESSIONAL SANCTIONS ON DOMESTICALLY VIOLENT ATTORNEYS

Some legal commentators argue against the propriety of
subjecting domestically violent attorneys to professional discipline. 183 Opponents maintain that judicial sanctioning of domestically violent attorneys allows the government to intrude
into their private lives because the misconduct does not ordinarily arise from the rendering of professional services. l84 On
the other hand, proponents of imposing discipline posit that
even though domestic violence is not ordinarily committed in
attorneys' professional capacity, such misconduct nevertheless
indicates a lack of integrity and judgment that threaten both
the Jtublic and the reputation of the legal profession. 185 As the
reasoning goes, attorneys violate the profession's ideals of
honesty, trustworthiness, truthfulness, reliability and commitment to the judicial process and the administration of justice
by committing acts of domestic violence. 186 Therefore, courtimposed sanctions are proper though the underlying misconduct may not be directly related to the practice of law. 187
See, Levin, supra note 4, at 44-46.
See id.
183 See Geraghty, supra note 70, at 485-488.
184 See id. at 485 (citing Kevin Campbell, Letter, Fight the Lynch Mob Mentality
in Domestic Violence Cases, 140 N.J.L.J. 36 (April 24, 1995». See also Hansen, supra
note 70, at 14.
185 See, e.g., Geraghty, supra note 70, at 486; see also Patterson, 369 N.W.2d at
800-801.
186 See, e.g., Principato, 655 A.2d 920.
187 See Geraghty, supra note 70, at 485-488. See also, e.g., Musick, 960 P.2d 89
(noting that the fact that misconduct is not directly related to the practice of law consequently becomes relegated to a mere factor in determining the extent of discipline
and not determinative of whether to impose discipline). Furthermore, in contrast to
the disciplinary authorities of other professions, courts consistently hold attorneys to
higher standards of professional responsibility for engaging in conduct that is not directly related to the practice of law. See Geraghty, supra, at 487-488. For example,
181

182
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Critics also complain that professional discipline for acts
of domestic violence exposes attorneys to dual punishment. ISS
The rationale for this conclusion is that criminal law provides
sufficient punishment for those who commit domestic violence. lS9 Thus, when attorneys are professionally sanctioned
as well, they are unnecessarily punished twice. 190 Courts generally circumvent this argument by recognizing that the primary goal of attorney discipline is not to punish but to protect
the public and preserve the reputation of the legal
profession. 191
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE OF ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS

Disciplinary courts generally characterize attorney disciplinary proceedings as being neither criminal nor civil in nature. 192 Instead, courts describe these proceedings as quasicriminal.1 93 Therefore, attorney discipline proceedings are
unique 194 and thus implicate distinct procedural quandaries. 195
First and foremost, an attorney facing professional discipline is not presumed innocent until proven guilty.196 Second,
the state bar need not prove the attorney's alleged misconduct
beyond a reasonable doubt. 197 Instead, the state bar need only
physicians are rarely disciplined for misconduct that is not directly related to the
practice of medicine. See id. at 487. Additionally, professional athletes are seldom dis. ciplined by their leagues for private misconduct, such as committing an act of domestic violence. See id. For example, in a recent case, Jason Kidd, of the Phoenix Suns
basketball team, admitted to hitting his wife and cutting her lip after an all-day argument. He voluntarily sat out about six games so that he could attend to his' marital
problems. See Associated Press, Kidd to Leave Suns to Work Out Problems with His
Wife (visited January 20, 2001) <http://sports.exCite.com/nbalnews/010120/sl-sportsnba-3389579>.
188 See Geraghty, supra note 70, at 488.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See, e.g., Howard, 673 A.2d at 802; see also 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 623.
192 See Helen Chun Parker, Note, Attorneys Who Plead the Fifth: How the SelfIncrimination Provision Applies to New Jersey Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings, 27
RUTGERS L. J. 493, 498 (1996).
193 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 624(b).
194 See Parker, supra note 192, at 498.
195 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 623.
196 See id. § 623(a).
197 See id. § 624(a).
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prove that the attorney has committed the prohibited acts by
clear and convincing evidence. 198 Third, the technical rules of
evidence as applied in criminal· trials do not apply to disciplinary proceedings. 199 The evidence need only be legally sufficient for the court to consider it at a disciplinary hearing.200
Fourth, the entrapment defense is not available to attorneys
charged with disciplinary violations that stem from criminal
offenses,201 such as domestic violence. Accordingly, although
the defendant attorney may allege entrapment as a defense to
criminal charges, disciplinary courts may nevertheless impose
professional sanctions because the state bar did not commit
the entrapment. 202 Finally, an unreasonable delay, without a
showing of prejudice, in bringing a disciplinary proceeding
does not mandate dismissal, as it would in the criminal
context.203
These procedural differences fail to recognize that a
state's challenge to an attorney's license to practice law puts
as much at stake as in some criminal proceedings. 204 The possibility of disbarment jeopardizes an attorney's entire livelihood. 205 Thus, an attorney facing disciplinary sanctions should
be entitled to the same legal protections provided in a criminal proceeding. 206 For this reason, attorneys are guaranteed
the privilege against self-incrimination in disciplinary hearings. 207 But overall, attorney discipline proceedings afford the
accused higher standards of protection, such as requiring
clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance, and thus recognize that these matters risk significantly
198
199
200

See id.
See id. § 623(b).
See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 624(b) (citing In re Richardson, 209 Cal. 492

(1930)).
201 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 623(d) (citing Wong v. State Bar, 15 Cal.3d
528 (1975)).
202 See id.· (distinguishing Patty v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 9 Cal.3d 356
(1973)).
203 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 623(e) (recognizing, however, that unreasonable delay may be considered as a mitigating factor).
204 See id. § 623.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 624 (noting that the right to invoke the 5th
Amendment in disciplinary hearings may in fact work against the attorney since cooperation in the process is considered a mitigating factor by many courts).
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more than do civil actions. 20B
Court decisions to impose discipline on domestically violent attorneys are nevertheless open to further scrutiny. First,
disciplinary courts have not adequately impressed the seriousness of domestic violence upon the public and errant attorneys. Second, courts have failed to ease the judicial process
for determining the appropriate level of professional sanction
to be imposed on attorneys who engage in domestic violence.
Part IV expands on these concerns.
IV. CRITIQUE
The primary problem with the current treatment is that
courts rarely characterize an attorney's acts of domestic violence as misconduct that involves moral turpitude. 209 Courts
generally define moral turpitude as a base, vile, or depraved
act in the private and social duties a person owes to others
that is contrary to the accepted and customary right and duty
between persons. 210 Disappointingly, only three disciplinary
courts have fit domestic violence into that definition for purposes of imposing attorney sanctions.2l1
The first case that declared attorney domestic violence to
be conduct involving moral turpitude was Committee on ProfZ
Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Assoc. v. Patterson. 212
In that case, Patterson met a woman at a class. 213 They became romantically involved. 214 A few months later, Patterson's
girlfriend met with her former husband for dinner. 215 Although she had told Patterson that she was meeting a girlfriend, he found out that she had lied. 216 Patterson went to
her home and confronted her.217 Despite her confession, he be208 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 4, at 19 (urging that attorney discipline proceedings are closer to criminal than not).
209 See cases cited supra note 93. These are the only three cases that have defined the attorneys' acts of domestic violence as conduct involving moral turpitude.
210 See, e.g., In re Calaway, 20 Cal. 3d 165 (1977).
211 See cases cited supra note 93.
212 369 N.W.2d 798.
213 See id. at 799-800.
214 See id.
215 See id.
216 See Patterson, 369 N.W.2d at 799-800.
217 See id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3

178 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2

gan striking her and tore off her clothes. 218 Mter beating her
for about two hours,219 Patterson cared for his girlfriend's
wounds. 220 Soon afterwards, Patterson left the state and
sought psychiatric help.221 He took the clothing he had torn off
of his victim during the beating out of state and destroyed
it. 222 Patterson pled guilty to the criminal charges that
followed. 223
The Iowa Supreme Court suspended Patterson from the
practice of law for an indefinite term for his acts of domestic
violence. 224 However, the court declared his license eligible for
reinstatement after three months. 225 In doing so, the Patterson
court recognized that the purpose of attorney discipline is to
preserve public confidence in the legal profession and bolster
the layperson's respect for the law. 226 The court described Patterson's misconduct "as morally reprehensible [as] accepting
gifts in violation ofa federal statute limiting attorney fees;
having possession of marijuana and amphetamines; or making
obscene phone calls."227 Accordingly, the Patterson court found
the attorney's acts of domestic violence to be conduct involving moral turpitude. 228
The second case in which a court defined an attorney's
acts of domestic violence as involving moral turpitude was In
re Runyon, an Indiana Supreme Court case. 229 In Runyon, an
attorney forced his way into his former spouse's apartment,
struck her with a club, and held her at gunpoint with an M10 machine gun. 230 Runyon surrendered after the apartment
manager let the police into the apartment. 231 Mter assuring
See id.
See id.
220 See id. (noting that pictures of the victim taken the next day evidenced Patterson's skill as a martial artist).
221 See Patterson, 369 N.W.2d at 799-800.
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See id. at 800-801.
225 See id. (opting to order suspension rather than follow the state bar's recommended censure).
228 See Patterson, 369 N.W.2d at 800-801.
227 See id. at 801.
228 See id. at 800-801.
229 491 N.E.2d 190.
230 See id.
231 See id.
218
219
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that Runyon had not physically injured the victim,232 the police arrested him. Runyon was convicted of unlawful possession of firearms.233
The Indiana Supreme Court consequently disbarred Run234
yon. The court reasoned that Runyon's acts were heinous,
regardless of his motive, intent or mental state. 235 The Runyon court stated that it had a' duty to protect the public from
unfit lawyers, whatever the cause. 236 Accordingly, the court
defined Runyon's violence as acts of moral turpitude that reflected adversely on his fitness to practice law. 237
The only other case to date that has defined attorney domestic violence as involving moral turpitude is People v.
Brailsford. 238 In that case, an attorney with the Colorado Attorney General's office was convicted of committing thirddegree sexual assault against his wife. 239 In March 1989,
while his wife was sleeping on the couch, Brailsford got on top
of her, pinned her down, and undressed her.240 She resisted by
yelling "No" and hitting him on the back with her fists.241 But
he did not relent and forced her to have sex with him.242 During the attack, Mrs. Brailsford had difficulty breathing, and
experienced a lot of pain.243 After the attack, she complained
of chest and leg pain.244
The Colorado Supreme Court suspended Brailsford from
practicing law for one year and a day.245 The court also required him to petition for reinstatement at the end of the actual suspension term and to attend group therapy to address
See id.
See id.
234 See Runyon, 491 N.E.2d 190.
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See id.
238 933 P.2d 592 (holding that the acts of domestic violence involved moral
turpitude).
239 See id. at 594.
240 See id.
241 See id. (noting that while Brailsford weighed over 255 pounds, his wife was
much smaller and suffered from asthma attacks).
242 See id.
243 See Brailsford, 933 P.2d at 594.
244 See id.
245 See id. at 596 (failing to mention the significance of the extra day of
suspension).
232

233
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his violent tendencies. 246 The court found the following aggravating factors: (1) his wife testified that Brailsford had beaten
her throughout the marriage;247 (2) he attacked his victim in
the middle of the night in the privacy of their home;248 (3)
Brailsford was disparately larger than his wife;249 and (4) he
knowingly inflicted harm on his victim. 250 Despite a number of
mitigating factors,251 the Brailsford court held that Brailsford's conduct involved moral turpitude, which reflected adversely on his fitness to practice law. 252
The common thread in these three cases is that the
courts have defined the attorney misconduct as involving
moral turpitude. However, the reason these courts reached
that conclusion where other courts have failed to do so is unclear. The following analysis gives insight. Firstly, all three
victims were women. But this fact seems insignificant, as all
the cases cited by this Comment involve attorneys committing
acts of domestic violence against women. Secondly, Patterson
and Brailsford involved sexual assault. In Patterson, although
there was no accusation of rape, the attorney tore off his victim's clothing, whereas in Brailsford the attorney raped his
victim. Finally, Patterson used his martial art mastery to
badly injure his victim, Brailsford used his overbearing size to
force his victim into having sex with him, and Runyon burglarized his victim's home armed with a machine gun.253 In
sum, these cases involved attorneys who preyed on especially
vulnerable victims by extraordinary means of force or violence
likely prompted the Runyon, Patterson and Brailsford courts
to define the attorneys' acts as involving moral turpitude.
Accordingly, the Patterson court stated that the attorney's
misconduct clearly met the definition of moral turpitude
246 See id. (imposing this sanction as opposed to a public censure and conditions
recommended by the lower disciplining body).
247 See id.
248 See Brailsford, 933 P.2d at 596.
249 See id.
250 See id.
251 See id. at 595 (recognizing no prior discipline, candor, cooperation, criminal
sanctions, loss of his job, public and editorial comment on the incident, remorse, substantial interim rehabilitation, a clear understanding of wrongfulness, and psychological improvement as mitigating factors).
252 See id. at 595-596.
253 491 N.E.2d 189.
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based on the incident. 254 The Runyon court concluded that the
evidence adduced at the underlying criminal trial proved that
the attorney's misconduct involved moral turpitude. 255 And in
the most recent of these cases, the Brailsford court defined
the underlying domestic violence as involving moral turpitude
because the attorney sexually assaulted his victim. 256
Exemplary of the current inadequate treatment of domestically violent attorneys is a Maryland Supreme Court case,
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Painter.257 The
Painter court was presented with a case where it should have
declared the attorney's domestic violence to be base, vile acts
contrary to modern day social mores and thus involving moral
turpitude. Yet, it failed to do so.
In Painter, an attorney repeatedly beat his wife and children over the course of almost twenty years. 258 For instance,
Painter once gave his son a black eye for his first birthday.259
On another occasion, Painter grabbed his son and beat his
head against the wall for turning on the wrong fan switch. 260
When his wife and her sister tried to intervene, he called his
sister-in-law "a stupid, fucking bitch."261 Painter also threw
his son against walls and choked him on occasion. 262 As for
his daughter, he verbally abused her by calling her a "fucking
brat."263 Even worse, when she was in the first grade, Painter
told his daughter that "[she] was nothing but a fucking, goddamn bitch, just like [her] mother."264 He also physically
abused his daughter. He once grabbed her around the neck,
choked her, and shook her for accidentally messing his hair.265
When she was five, Painter punched his daughter while they
were in a restaurant for refusing to drink orange juice. 266 He
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

264
265
266

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

369 N.W.2d at 801.
491 N.E.2d at 190.
933 P.2d at 596.
739 A.2d 24.
id. at 26-27.
id.
id.
id.
Painter, 739 A.2d at 26-27.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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also beat and kicked her dog and threw it off the second story
deck.267
Painter's behavior towards his wife was equally reprehensible. He beat her regularly, starting on their honeymoon. 268
Painter beat her head against the garage floor, swung a
hatchet at her, and called her a "goddamn fucking bitch."269
Then he jumped on her, and pounded her head. 270 Finally,
Mrs. Painter, fed up, left to her mother's home. After Painter
promised to never abuse her again, she returned home. 271 But
the violent cycle continued. Painter knocked her out of a
chair, jumped on her and beat her. She freed herself and ran
outside of the house. 272 Painter followed her out, "kicked her,
cursed her, choked her, bashed her head and pulled her
hair."273 When Painter threatened to kill himself or her, she finally secured a protective court order. 274 But that did not stop
his abusive attempts. Mrs. Painter noticed her husband
parked down the block from her home, so she phoned the police. 275 When the officers arrested him, they found two loaded
guns.276
Finding no mitigating factors, the court disbarred
Painter.277 It reasoned that Painter showed no appreciable insight or explanation for his pattern of violence that spanned
16 years. 278 Furthermore, because he had been subjected to
prior discipline for striking a former girlfriend and threatening her with a gun, Painter deserved disbarment. 279
But, despite the egregious acts of violence against his
family, the court did not characterize Painter's acts of domestic violence as conduct involving moral turpitude. 280 The grue267
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some abuse to which Painter subjected his family presented
the perfect opportunity for the Maryland court to declare an
attorney's acts of domestic violence as base, vile and contrary
to modern day social mores. However, the Painter court held
that the acts were merely prejudicial to the administration of
justice. 281 This is an incredible understatement, unreflective of
the serious problem domestic violence presents to society.
The abuse in Painter was more egregious than the acts of
domestic violence in Patterson, Runyon and Brailsford, which
did determine the misconduct involved moral turpitude. First,
the abuse in Painter occurred over a prolonged period rather
than on a single isolated occasion. 282 Painter violently beat
and verbally abused his wife and children over the course of
approximately twenty years.283 In comparison, Patterson severely beat and disfigured his girlfriend in a single incident of
violence,284 while Runyon forced his way into his girlfriend's
apartment, held her at gunpoint and struck her with a club
on a single occasion. Further, Brailsford forced his wife to
have sex with him on one occasion. 285 No one could disagree
that each of these cases, including Painter, involved base and
vile acts of domestic violence that are contrary to modern day
social mores. However, the severity of the violence, combined
with the long cycle of abuse involved in Painter makes a very
strong case for misconduct involving moral turpitude. In fact,
Painter presents an even stronger case than Runyon and
Brailsford, considering that the violence in those cases occurred only on a single occasion and the harm was minimal,
whereas in Painter prolonged abuse was not only aimed at the
wife but also at the children. Based on the foregoing analysis,
there was no legitimate reason for the Painter court not to define the abusive acts as involving moral turpitude. This is especially alarming in cases, such as Painter, where courts recognize domestic violence as a serious problem in modern day
society,286 yet paradoxically fail to define the underlying acts
See id. at 32.
See, e.g., id. at 30 (recognizing the fact that the incident was isolated as a
mitigating factor).
283 See id. at 29.
281

282

284
285
286

369 N.W.2d 798.
933 P.2d 592 .
739 A.2d at 29.
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of domestic violence as base, vile conduct that is contrary to
modern day social mores. 287
Under disciplinary courts' current approach to imposing
professional discipline on domestically violent attorneys, outcomes are unpredictable; the process is inefficient; and the decisions are inconsistent, except that suspension is the favored
sanction. Moreover, only three courts have characterized attorneys' acts of domestic violence as conduct involving moral
turpitude. Consequently, courts have not completely recognized the serious problem that domestic violence presents to
our society, at least when it comes to imposing attorney
discipline.

v.

PROPOSAL

Courts uniformly insist that the primary goal of imposing
attorney sanctions is not to punish misbehaved or errant attorneys.288 Instead attorney discipline is designed to protect
the public, defend the reputation of the legal profession, and
preserve public confidence in lawyers.289 Punishment may not
be the primary court-professed goal of imposing these sanctions, yet there are concomitant punitive effects that must
nonetheless be considered. More importantly, few disciplinary
courts enlist the rehabilitative opportunity attorney sanction
proceedings provide.

A.

REVITALIZING CALIFORNIA'S FORMER APPROACH TO IMPOSING
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE FOR MISCONDUCT THAT INVOLVES MORAL
TuRPITUDE

Disciplinary courts have used many approaches to imposing discipline on misbehaved or errant attorneys.290 For example, in the 1950's, California entertained a unique system for
disciplining attorneys who committed crimes involving moral
turpitude. When an attorney was convicted of a crime, the
See, e.g. Painter, 739 A.2d 24.
See, e.g., Stephen G. Bene, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907, 912-915 (1991).
289 See id.
290 See generally id. (urging the consideration of monetary sanctions in attorney
discipline); see also Levin, supra note 4, at 83 (urging for detailed written standards
regarding imposing attorney discipline to bolster the efficacy of the process).
287

288
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normal procedures for imposing professional discipline did not
apply.291 Instead, the criminal trial court forwarded the attorney's conviction record to the California Supreme Court.292
The Supreme Court then automatically suspended the attorney from the practice of law. 293 Once the conviction became final,294 the high court considered the facts of the case to determine whether the attorney's conduct involved acts of moral
turpitude. 295 If so, the court disbarred the attorney.296 In the
mid-1950's, the uncertainty of the 'moral turpitude' test gave
way to legislation and disciplinary rules enacted to remedy
difficulties that resulted from the automatic suspension and
disbarment procedure. 297 However, these problems are otherwise resolvable to allow the moral turpitude test to be
revived.
For purposes of attorney discipline, the state bar should
define domestic violence as conduct involving moral turpitude
per se. 298 This approach would eliminate the uncertainty
presented by the moral turpitude test. Thus, upon filing criminal charges against an attorney for committing acts of domestic violence, the prosecutor's office would submit a copy of
its entire case file to the disciplinary court. This would provide the court with two primary benefits. Firstly, the justices
would have time to prepare for any subsequent disciplinary
proceedings. Secondly, the decision would not rest solely on a
"bare bones" conviction record. Once conviction of domestic violence is final, the court should then impose the appropriate
discipline against the attorney, as set forth in Section B im291 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 526 (1) (citing In re Rothrock, 25 Cal. 2d 588,
589 (1944».
292 See id.
293 See id.
294 A conviction is considered final when the time for appeal has expired and no
appeal had been filed, or if an appeal has been filed it has been denied or the conviction has been affirmed. See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 530(b).
295 See id. § 529(a).
296 See id. § 526(1) (citing Rothrock, 25 C.2d at 589).
297 See id.
298 This would circumvent the requirement of courts to determine on a case-bycase basis whether the attorney's conduct involved moral turpitude by automatically
defining an attorney's criminal conviction for domestic violence as involving moral
turpitude. Thus the uncertainty of the moral turpitude test that triggered its abolishment in the 1950's would no longer be a factor.
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mediately below. 299 This system will not only better protect
the public, but also afford accused attorneys the benefit of discipline being dependent on criminal conviction with all the attendant safeguards of those proceedings. Furthermore, the attorney discipline process will be more consistent and
predictable.
B.

CAPITALIZING ON THE REHABILITATIVE OPPORTUNITY THAT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS PROVIDE

Beyond mere censure or suspension, courts should uniformly impose sanctions geared toward rehabilitation on attorneys who are convicted of domestic violence. 30o Requiring
attorneys to attend counseling, volunteer their legal services
to the less fortunate, and otherwise make restitution will further impress upon these offenders the seriousness of their
acts. Such an approach will also grant to those attorneys who
are amenable the opportunity for betterment. Thus, the offending attorney, the legal profession, and the public will reap
the full benefits that disciplinary proceedings offer. However,
more severe sanctions must remain available to courts to
properly address more severe acts of domestic violence.
1. Sanctions for Less Serious First- Time Offenders

Rehabilitative measures recognize the relationship between the stresses associated with practicing law and attorney misconduct. 301 Of course, one attorney's first incident of
domestic violence may be more serious than another attorney's first incident, but this qualitative difference can be ac299 When a complaint is brought to the direct attention of the state bar that an
attorney allegedly committed acts of domestic violence, the state bar must relay the
complaint to the prosecutor's office so that criminal proceedings can begin. When the
conviction is final, the state bar may begin discipline proceedings. However, since acquittal or non-prosecution is not determinative on the administration of attorney
sanctions, the state bar must provide for an independent hearing in those circumstances to determine whether the alleged acts of domestic violence occurred. If so,
then the state bar must subject the attorney to sanctions pursuant to this proposal.
300 See, e.g., John D. Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 355, 379 (1986) (urging that criminal sanctions could be considered discipline for
attorney misconduct).
301 See Levin, supra note 4, at 23-25.
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counted for. 302 For the purposes of attorney discipline, a less
serious offense should include the following traits. 303 The incident did not leave physical or mental injury to the victim. For
example, incidents that resulted in no physical markings,
abrasions, bleeding, broken bones, or mental torture, such as
false imprisonment, or threats, such as a threat to take the
children away, or did not involve the use of a weapon belong
in this category. In these less-serious, isolated incidents, attorney sanctions should be geared more toward rehabilitation. 304
Accordingly, disciplinary officials should establish the following rehabilitative measures to bolster the efficacy of traditional attorney sanctions.
First, public censure should be mandatory for any domestic violence serious enough to come to the attention of the
state bar. This measure would have a deterrent effect in that
it is a public admonishment. 305 Additionally, it would inform
the public of the misconduct, enabling people to make a more
informed decision of whether to retain the services of these
attorneys. Public censure will also display to the public the
"no nonsense" attitude that disciplinary officials take toward,
even first-time, less-serious, domestically violent attorneys.
Second, courts should require these attorneys to attend a
domestic violence prevention program (hereinafter "DVPP").306
Forums such as these will allow the domestically violent attorney to recognize the causes of stress that is associated with
the day-to-day demands of the legal profession. The offender
will also be taught how to identify his anger before it esca302 See generally id. (suggesting that a delicate balance between uniformity of
discipline and consideration of the particular facts of the case is necessary to impose
effective lawyer sanctions).
303 This minimal use of case-by-case analysis is necessary and useful for distinguishing the varying degrees of severity of domestic violence in attorney discipline
cases. Furthermore, it is the disparity in sanctions that this Comment is concerned
with most and thus urges that case-by-case analysis in determining the extent of attorney sanction is inappropriate and unnecessary.
304 Domestically violent attorneys should be automatically placed on probation as
an enforcement device rather than a merely punitive one.
305 See Levin, supra note 4, at 21-23.
306 In recognition that at times domestic violence is the fault not of one but of
both persons involved, courts should give due consideration to attorneys who voluntarily attend marriage or relationship counseling in addition to the mandatory domestic
violence prevention program. Courts should also consider mandating substance and!
or alcohol abuse intervention programs should such abuse be a concern in the case.
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lates into violent acts. The program will also offer insight on
how to deal with misplaced anger. Encouraging these attorneys to properly channel their tension should, in turn, reduce
the risk of domestic violence.
Third, courts should mandate that domestically violent
attorneys contribute a minimum number of hours of pro bono
legal aid. Though it may be impractical to require that these
attorneys become experts in all areas of law, the average attorney should be able to handle uncontested divorces, filing
and serving temporary restraining orders, simple custody issues, and simple estate planning. However, when a matter is
particularly complicated then the attorney should be required
to assist attorneys who are experts in these areas. For example, domestically violent attorneys should be required to assist
prosecutors assigned to the domestic violence caseload. This
would allow the offenders to understand the seriousness of domestic violence, while granting greatly needed aid to the
overburdened criminal justice system. Consequently, these attorneys would also be afforded an opportunity to understand
the ill effect domestic violence has on the legal system as a
whole.

2. Sanctions for Repeat or More Severe First-Time Offenders
Attorneys who have violated a prior condition of probation for domestic violence or committed a more severe incident of domestic violence deserve harsher treatment. 307 The
above-recommended treatment should be required of these attorneys as well, but to a more severe degree. For example,
courts should require more DVPP sessions, a longer pro bono
commitment, as well as a lengthier probationary period. However, the sanctions must not end there. The more serious incidents or recidivism should mandate suspension from the practice of law for at least six months. 308 Courts should also
impose substantial fines against these attorneys and distribute the funds to various charitable causes that further
307 See, e.g., Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378 (recognizing an abusive pattern as an aggravating factor for determining the appropriate level of lawyer sanction).
308 The lengths are somewhat arbitrary but it is the uniformity of application
that will justify them.
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anti-domestic violence efforts.309
Attorneys who commit a subsequent act of domestic violence, despite being subjected to the foregoing sanctions must
be disbarred. Domestically violent attorneys, who recidivate,
permanently tarnish the reputation of the legal profession.
Thus, recidivists deserve the severest sanction. 310 Moreover,
while the lower levels of sanctions may be labeled as being
geared toward specific deterrence and rehabilitation of the offending attorney, this final level of sanction goes further. The
threat of disbarment will further general deterrence. That is,
those domestically violent attorneys in the two lower tiers of
sanction will know what awaits them should they recidivate.
Such swift, certain, and severe sanctions will ensure that
courts will not stand idly by while the confidence in the legal
profession is threatened by violent attorneys with no respect
for the law.
C. C~EATING INCENTIVE FOR STATES TO ADOPT THIS PROPOSED
APPROACH TO DISCIPLINING DOMESTICALLY VIOLENT ATTORNEYS
Revamping the system cannot stop with attorney discipline. Congress must also enact legislation, similar to the
VAWA, which provides additional monetary incentives for
states to adopt approaches like the one that is set forth above.
The VAWA provides grants to states that demonstrate a general commitment to increased arrests or lengthier incarceration of violent offenders. 311 Once granted, these funds are
earmarked to facilitate the prevention of violence against
women. 312
VAWA funding is necessary and helpful, but more is
needed. Thus Congress must authorize appropriations to
states whose high courts have demonstrated a general commitment to facilitating the ease, predictability, and judicial efficiency of imposing attorney sanctions in domestic violence
cases. Congress should provide grants to states that have implemented state bar rules that define domestic violence as a
crime involving moral turpitude. Congress should also grant
309
310

311
312

See Bene, supra note 288.
See, e.g., Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378.
See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
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funds to states that have implemented rules of state bar procedure that include a definite and structured scheme of sanctions, such as the scheme set forth above. The legislation
should provide additional grants to those states that have
provided for a rehabilitative approach for certain qualified offenders, such as first-time, less-severe domestic violence offenders. Congress should also grant funds to states that
demonstrate adherence to a system of attorney discipline
based on the moral turpitude test, at least for nonprofessional criminal offenses, such as domestic violence.
VI. CONCLUSION

Disciplinary courts have inconsistently sanctioned domestically violent attorneys. Though suspension is the most often
imposed sanction, no standards guide the process. The reasons that justify attorney sanctions in these cases may generally reflect ABA guidelines, but that is not enough. A consistent and predictable system of attorney discipline is needed,
particularly when disciplinary officials are sanctioning conduct that involves moral turpitude, such as domestic violence.
Even more concerning, few disciplinary courts have made the
connection between domestic violence and moral turpitude despite the serious threat domestic violence presents to American society.
Consequently, a complete revamping of the current approach to imposing discipline on domestically violent attorneys is needed. In addition to protecting the public and preserving the integrity of the legal profession, a disciplinary
system must also provide an errant attorney with an opportunity for rehabilitation; an aspect currently lacking in the attorney discipline process. The uniformity in discipline that
would flow from the proposed approach will also better address current concerns, such as ease of application and predictability of sanction. Judicial efficiency and fairness in the
disciplinary process will also be maximized. Accordingly, the
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time has come to shelve the current approach to imposing discipline on domestically violent attorneys and breathe new life
into the process.
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